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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to draw attention to some aspects of voluntary disdosure that current research 
studies in this area generally do not take into account. 
Current disdosure research tends to analyze and explain differences in aggregate voluntary 
disdosure among firms within a single period by relating 'overall' measures of disdosure to 
certain firm characteristics as size. It wiïl be argued that studies of this type can usefully be 
complemented by studies that consider more extensively: 
- differences in disdosure behaviour among items of disdosure rather than among firms; 
- developments in disdosure over longer periods of time; 
- the possible existence of "grey" areas between mandatory and voluntary disdosure; 
- the existence of firm- or country specific factors influenting disdosure. 
Taking these issues into account may extend or modify some of the conclusions reached in 
earlier studies. 
It can readily be seen that this requires a certain departure from the methods characterized by 
aggregation and the use of statistical models common in current disdosure research. Case 
studies taking into account factors that are less easily quantifiable and/or specific to the case 
situation are called for. The fact that results from such studies are less easy to generalize makes 
it necessary to stress that they are intended as complementary to more formal studies, adding 
some colour to their results or introducing some caution in the making of assumptions in those 
studies. 
In this paper a case study along the Unes sketched above will be presented on the gradual 
(voluntary) introduction of sales disdosure in the Netherlands over the period of 1945-1970. 
Some reasons for the choice of this item and this (historical) period will be given below. The 
study is intended as an initial exploration of the influence of the aspects mentioned. 
This paper is organized as follows: a short description of the method and results of current 
disdosure research is given, foliowed by an evaluation in which the desirability of a slightly 
different emphasis is made clear. 
This different emphasis is then provided by the case study which involves a short description of 
the reporting environment during the period concerned, a description of the data used and an 
explanation of their provenance, a first analysis of the data in which, in harmony with earlier 
studies, a certain correlation with size is established, and, subsequently, a modification of these 
findings taking into account the points mentioned above. 
2. Current disdosure research 
In the literature on (voluntary) disdosure, a family of research can be. distinguished, starting 
with the work of Cerf (1961) and continuing to the present day.1 
The common feature of this approach is the use of "disdosure indices". Typically, a research 
study would consider the financial statements of a number of companies for one year, crediting 
firms for each of a series of items that it discloses. The scores for all the items are summed, in 
which process weights may or may not be attached to the scores on the various items. 
Subsequently, the resulting indices are related to firm characteristics as size, industry and listing 
status, usually by multiple regression analysis. 
1
 Studies in this fashion indude: Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), Choi (1973), Buzby 
(1974, 1975), Barrett (1977), Chow and Wong (1987), Cooke (1989) and Waagenhofer (1990), 
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The results of these studies support the hypothesis that size, and to a lesser extent industry, are 
correlated with voluntary disclosure. It is acknowledged that size is not an explanation of 
disclosure in its own right, but rather an indication of the strength of forces stimulating 
voluntary disclosure. These forces are usually presented in a somewhat abstract way, for instance 
by assuming the existence of shareholder-debtholder-management contracting (mentioned by 
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), applied by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987)), without 
relating such hypotheses to the institutional setting of the situation being studied. 
Reasons for considering complementary research methods can be divided into technical problems 
associated with the index method and limitations in the scope of the method, either intrinsically 
linked to it or caused by the choice of the areas where it has been employed. 
Technical considerations include: 
1. the question of whether or not to use weighted scores, and the determination of weights when 
used. 
Weights are seen as expressions of the value users attach subjectively to items of information. If 
one wants to classify firms as being more or less informative in their financial reporting, it 
would seem that some valuation of the different items is necessary. However, the assumption 
that value is derived from subjective judgments by users makes this more or less impossible. 
Survey techniques have been used (Buzby 1974, Chow and Wong 1987) though not with 
undisputed success (See Benjamin and Stanga 1977, Dhaliwal 1980). More recent research has 
tended to drop the use of weights (Cooke 1989, Wagenhofer 1990). This can be justified on 
either of two grounds only. 
* firms are consistent in their disclosure behaviour. That is, firms that disclose 'valuable' items 
better than others are likely to disclose less 'valuable' items better as well. 
* a sufficiënt number of items is included in the index to average out inconsistent behaviour. 
This brings the risk that the analysis is dominated by large numbers of less material items. 
2. the fact that non-disclosure of an item might be caused by the fact that the particular item is 
not relevant to the firm being studied. As the relevance of an item can often only be judged 
when information about it is disclosed, this presents a considerable problem. 
It can be handled by deliberately ignoring it (Singhvi and Desai 1971), by using only items that 
are relevant to all firms (Barrett 1977), or to use more or less subjective judgment to decide 
what is applicable and what not (Cooke 1989). Again, using large numbers of items might help 
to reduce the effect of wrong scoring, but again at the possible cost of relevance and clarity of 
the results. 
These two technical problems associated with the aggregate method might warrant some caution 
in its use. This paper, though, will not present any suggestions for solving the second problem. 
In addition to these technical considerations, there are reasons of scope: 
1. Dynamic aspects of voluntary disclosure. 
Disclosure research tends to present voluntary disclosure as a choice firms make from a given 
set of items that are not presently required by some form of regulation. Changes in the set of 
items, or changes in the way choices are made from this set are generally not part of the 
research question. Questions that might be considered include those concerning: 
- the reasons why items are at some point in time seen as possible elements of financial 
statements; 
- the forces or influences underlying voluntary disclosure: do they change over time, and are 
they sufficiënt to complete the dissemination of disclosure without the support of regulation ? 
Extending disclosure research over longer periods of time has been advocated by some authors 
(Dhaliwal 1980, Wagenhofer 1990). Technically, it would increases the difficulties of the index 
method due to changing user preferences over time. The mechanics for 'dynamic' research have 
to be worked out as yet. 
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2. Differences in disclosure behaviour among items. 
As described above, the fact that the nature of items might cause firms to act differently 
where different items are conceraed is not regularly taken into account. When it is taken into 
account, it is done in such a way as to eliminate the effect of individual items on the final 
results, by using weights. 
A related question concerns the type of items that are studied. In most current reporting 
environments, financial reporting is regulated to a considerable extent. When voluntary reporting 
is studied in such an environment, only items that are relatively marginal can properly be taken 
into account. The results from such studies might be influenced by the fact that only such items 
are dealt with. An indication of the effect of this influence can be obtained by studying data 
from a less regulated period that is close enough to the present day to give some confidence in 
the applicability of the conclusions to current reporting. 
3. Less than voluntary reporting. 
The use of disclosure indices usually involves a clear distinction between what is mandatory and 
what is not. In practice, such a distinction cannot always be made. Firms may feel compelled to 
publish information that is not formally enforceable. An example can be found in the guidelines 
issued by the Dutch private sector body of the council for financial reporting (Raad voor de 
Jaarverslaggeving). 
Although it is conceivable that a formal analysis be carried out involving several shades of 
compulsion, a more qualitative analysis seems called for in such cases. 
4. Miscellaneous factors. 
Voluntary reporting may finally be encouraged by a host of factors that are hard or impossible 
to quantify or generalize and/or specific to firms or countries. These include personal preferen-
ces of company managements and attempts to forestall further regulation (an ülustration is 
provided in Shank 1972). One could argue that it is the specific task of aggregate analysis to 
suppress the influence of such incidental factors, but this does not preclude the possibility of 
supplementing aggregate and quantitative research by more qualitative studies. 
In the remainder of this paper, an attempt is made to illustrate the points made above. A case 
study will be presented in which, first, the validity of the generally accepted hypothesis that 
disclosure is related to size will be established for the specific circumstances of the 
case. 
Subsequently, this general conclusion will be modified by showing that, according to this case: 
- the influence of size can differ among items; 
- factors underlying the relation of size and disclosure can change over time; 
- some factors influencing disclosure do not operate according to size (or, for that matter, 
according to other factors as industry or listing status) 
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3. Disclosure of saies in the Netherlands 1950-1970 
3.1. Introduction 
The particular period studied in this paper was not chosen at random. Studying this period for 
other reasons made it clear that it might serve as a suitable object of study from the point of 
view of voluntary disclosure. This suitability is derived from the fact that this period coupled the 
virtual absence of legal regulation with a quite sophisticated practice of financial reporting (see 
for instance Da Costa et.al. 1978). And moreover, the period seems not to be too far removed 
from the present as to give any conclusions merely a historica! value. 
The legal regulation of financial reporting by the Dutch commercial code (Wetboek van 
Koophandel) demanded since 1929 that Hsted companies and a limited number of other 
companies publish a balance sheet and an income statement. In the balance sheet a small 
number of items had to be presented separately, but the contents of the income statement were 
not regulated. Before the war, this resulted in a universal practice of publishing income 
statements, or rather, profit and loss accounts, which took the balance of the trading account as 
starting point. From this interest, depreciation and taxes, not always separately disclosed, were 
subtracted to arrive at net income (Munnik 1931, Koppenberg 1935). 
This type of financial reporting was not particular to the Netherlands. German legislation on 
financial reporting was, as far as the income statement was concerned, based on the "Netto-
prinzip" until 1959. German companies seem not to have exceeded this legal demand to a great 
extent, as German authors deplore the lack of openness on the part of German companies, 
especially when compared with American companies (for instance: Farr 1955). 
The UK Companies Act of 1948 did not require disclosure of sales. Such disclosure was first 
required by law in 1967. As far as practice is concerned, a slight indication can be obtained by 
the fact that in 1957 an income statement based on "operating income" was held up as an 
example to students of auditing (de Paula 1957). 
In these countries, one can, therefore, observe a movement of transition, requiring a certain 
period of time. This movement starts at a point at which sales disclosure is generally seen as 
detrimental to the interests of the companies involved. Then, gradually, such disclosure is called 
for by an increasing number of authors in the press and relevant journals, and a growing 
number of companies discloses voluntarily. Finally, such disclosure can be made mandatory by 
law or accounting standards. 
One can observe such transitions for any accounting phenomenon, but in the case of sales, the 
interests involved would make for a fairly protracted process. 
In the United States, this transition took place before WWII. Barr (1940) describes progress on 
the issue by comparing the almost universally required sales disclosure in financial statements 
files with the SEC with the tedious extension of sales disclosure on a voluntary basis ten years 
earlier. The inference is that the SEC has had a marked influence of sales disclosure. 
Benston (1969) has shown that the proportion of sales-disclosing companies rosé from 55 to 62 
percent of all companies listed on the NYSE over the period 1926-1934. These figures (together 
with other disclosure data) are seen to indicate a modest contribution of the SEC, as the 
amount of disclosure prior to the passage of the Securities Acts was already "considerable". 
The United States could therefore be held up as an example to German (Farr, 1955) and Dutch 
companies, not only in general, but also specifically in the case of sales disclosure. (Spinoza 
Catella (1948), Brands (1953), Sanders (1963)). Calls for emulation of American regulation, with 
explicit reference to sales, were made as well (Brouwer, 1962). 
In the Netherlands, revision of the 1929 company law provisions, including those on financial 
reporting, was a topic of almost continuous debate from the later fifties until the final effec-
tuation of change with the Act on Annual Accounts ('Wet op de Jaarrekening') of 1970. In 1960, 
calls for reform of company law resulted in the installation of an official commission (referred 
to as the Verdam commission after its chairman). From this moment on, and especially after 
publication of its report in early 1965, revision of the law, including extension of the regulation 
of financial reporting, became a near certainty. 
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During this period, the idea that financial reporting might be improved by voluntary action on 
the part of finns rather than by regulation by iaw found widespread acceptance. Experience of 
actual developments gave many contemporaries, especially but not exclusively from the business 
community, the confidence to state that a system resting mainly on voluntary improvements was 
superior to one that forced finns in a straitjacket of detailed rules that would stifle further 
innovation.2 
All this kept the issue of financial reporting alive - at least in the limited sense in which this 
word must be understood in the context of financial reporting - in the minds of the press, the 
public and the company managements. It would seem that decisions on financial reporting by 
managements would be made with some care, given the degree of public attention to financial 
reporting. 
During this period, one can therefore observe unregulated disclosure behaviour on quite crucial 
issues, like the disclosure of the sales figure. Sales disclosure remained a somewhat controversial 
issue throughout the period as companies were pressed on the one hand to disclose sales, but 
were reluctant to do so for competitive reasons. 
As late as 1969, when the leading financial paper (Het Financieele Dagblad) issued for the first 
time its annual survey of sales figures of large and middle-sized companies, many of the figures 
still had to be estimated by the editorial staff as the firms themselves were unwuling to provide 
the information. 
The difference in informative content between financial statements that do and do not show 
sales can easily be imagined. In a more formal analysis, Chow (1984) has attempted to show 
that the introduction of mandatory sales disclosure in the United States has caused a certain 
wealth transfer away from shareholders of companies that did not voluntarily disclose sales 
before this was required. This seems to imply that the apprehensions on the part of company 
managements were not altogether unfounded. 
In order to provide some perspective on the sales issue, its development will be contrasted by 
the developments in disclosure of a more or less uncontroversial item: comparative figures. The 
idea of showing last years figures gained acceptance roughly at the same time as the first sales 
disclosures (see: de Jong, 1956). Comparative figures are not nearly as sensitive information as 
is the sales figure. Except in the case of changes in the accounting principles used, they are 
scarcely more than a courtesy to the reader. Their inclusion in this study is intended to give an 
impression of the range of differences in disclosure behaviour among items. 
However, even in this case some reluctance to provide the information existed. Calls for showing 
comparative figures have been made since the early years of the century (eg Bleyswijk-Sombeek, 
1908) in the Netherlands without apparent results up to the period under study. Comparative 
figures are included as fairly significant elements of voluntary disclosure in the study of Singhvi 
(1977). In a study by Firth (1980), a survey of users of financial statements indicated that 
comparative figures were rated as moderately important. 
2
 Witnesses to this idea include: Philips (1962), Burgert (1965), Nordemann (1967), Louwers 
(1970), van Bruinessen (1975), and, for a German audience: Geertman (1955) 
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3.2. actual disdosure development - sample selection and data 
The actual development of sales disdosure is charted for a selection of 121 companies. This 
selection is the result of a stratified sample from the companies with shares listed on the 
Amsterdam Exchange in 1960. 
From the sample, two types of company were exduded. First, finandal companies (bank-
ing,insurance and building sodeties) were not included because of the different nature of their 
revenues. Second, a number of companies, set up to engage in activities in the former Dutch 
East Indies, had ceased to have any activity as a result of the nationalisations accompanying 
independence. These were excluded as well, leaving a total of 383 compames. 
These were grouped in four size categories. Size in this regard was defined as total reported 
asset value (consolidated if available) in the 1960 finandal statements. The purpose of this 
grouping was to obtain, on the one hand, a suffidently wide sample which could give an 
impression of overall developments, while allowing at the same time the formation of a more or 
less complete picture for the larger companies. From the first category (largest companies) all 
compames were included in the sample, from the other three random samples were drawn. 
Companies whose finandal statements could not be obtained were omitted from the final 
sample. The contents of the four size categories, the samples drawn from them and the numbers 
finaUy obtained can be summarized as follows: 
category: size: sampli 
I 50 50 
II 71 30 
III 71 30 
IV 191 30 
383 ïïïï 
For each of the firms selected, the finandal year in whidi sales or comparative figures were first 
disclosed in the finandal statements is noted. A firm is supposed to disclose sales if a sales 
figure for the firm as a whole is given anywhere in the finandal statements or the directors' 
report. A complete income statement is not required. 
The result is presented in the tables on p. 19-21, and in graph 2 on p. 18. 
This approach has at least one drawback: asset size is a very imperfect size measure. During this 
period, some companies which should have published consolidated statements did not do so. 
Other companies made extensive use of secret reserves (valuing assets at one guilder et cetera) 
while still other companies valued their assets on the basis of replacement value. All this reduces 
comparability among companies and reduces the value of assets as an indication of size. 
Alternative measures are hard to find, however. 
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33. Initial analysis 
33.1. Some technical considerations 
On extending disclosure research over several periods, one is confronted with two phenomena 
that are absent from static research. 
A. Changes in the number of companies 
In the course of time, the number of companies that could be included in such a research 
project changes, as a result of mergers, dissolutions, and, restricting the argument to listed 
companies, new listings and buy-outs. 
The picture of overall financial reporting practice is made up of a changing set of firms. If one 
works with a sample of compames rather than the whole population, it must be decided whether 
to follow a certain group of companies over a period of time, or to redefine the sample every 
period. The last approach would enable one to make pronouncements on the development of 
disclosure for, say, the largest companies. 
In this paper, a fixed group of companies is chosen, because this enables on to tracé the 
moments at which the decision to disclose an item is made. This group has been fixed somewhat 
arbitrarily on the basis of the 1960 size distribution, assuming that this represents a rough 
average. 
For years between 1950 and 1960, these compames are included in the sample from the moment 
of their introduction, or from 1950, whichever is the later date. 
For years between 1960 and 1970, companies are included as long as they were listed. An 
exception is made, though, for the case of mergers. A considerable number of mergers took 
place during the 1960's. If one would let all merged companies drop out of the sample, the 
results would to a certain extent be distorted, as these companies continued to be relevant for 
financial reporting. 
Therefore a somewhat subjective division is made between mergers and take-overs, to the effect 
that the components of merged companies are kept track of separately, and both credited for 
disclosure of the new combination. Companies that are considered as taken over are removed 
from the sample. 
The decision to label an amalgamation as 'merger' is taken on the basis of such criteria as the 
wording used in the announcement and the name of the new combination. 
One could use a similar procedure for pre-1960 mergers. In this sample, only a few of the 1960 
companies could be considered to be the result of a merger during the 1950's. These were 
ignored.3 
The result is that the number of compames in the sample varies over time, and that there are 
small deviations at the end of the period between the true and assumed numbers of compames 
in the sample due to mergers (see graph 1, p. 18). 
B. Changes in companv characteristics 
As the number of companies changes over time, so do their characteristics. Therefore, the most 
often used characteristics, size and industry, are not fixed. 
In order to link company characteristics with disclosure behaviour, one would ideally measure 
characteristics at the moment of a change in such behaviour. This would, however, seem to rule 
out the possibility of aggregate analysis, as different items will usually be initially disclosed at 
different moments. 
For instance: VMF was formed in 1955 as a merger of two compames. Of the two 
possible fictions, viewing VMF as a new introduction in 1955 was considered preferable to 
viewing the two components as separate companies up to 1970. 
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In the case of industry, using one Sxed characterization for all items seems quite defensible, 
though, as changes of industry will be comparatively rare. 
In the case of size, this cannot as easily be justified. Nevertheless, in this paper, out of practical 
considerations, a single size measure will be used. 
Size 
'Size' cannot be determined as easily as in the static case. Allowing for overall increases in 
absolute size requires that a measure of relative size, that is, simple rank order or share in total 
absolute size be used to ensure comparability over time. 
In this paper, the 'size' of a company will be deöned as the average of its rankings in the 
ordering according to total assets in both 1950 and 1970. 
The remark on size made under 3.2. is applicable here as well. 
Industry 
Following earlier studies (eg Wagenhofer 1990), a relatively simple industry classification is used. 
Firms are classed in one of four categories: Trade (n = 24), Industrial activities (n = 71), 
Transport (n = 15) and Miscellaneous (n = 11). This classification is assumed to be valid for 
the entire period. 
C. Scoring 
The disclosure performance on an item is initially taken to be the financial year in which a 
company first discloses that item. In order to ensure comparability among items, simple rank 
orders based on these years are used. As the ordering is based on the ending of the financial 
years, a financial year ending april 30th 1953 is ranked before a financial year ending december 
31st 1953. 
332. Findings 
Some correlation between size and disclosure of both items can be assumed. . This corresponds 
to the results of earlier studies. 
For combinations of industries, the hypothesis is tested that results for the two industries are 
drawn from populations with different means with regard to sales disclosure. Except for the 
category 'Miscellaneous', no significant deviations are found. 
From the fact that the 'miscellaneous' firms seem to have disclosed earlier than others, no 
simple conclusions can be drawn, as the category is indeed heterogeneous. Individual explana-
tions seem to be called for. For instance, the Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor de Walvisch-
vaart, a whaling company included in this group, sold a large part of its output to the govern-
4
 Spearman's coefficients: Significance levels (2-tailed) 
sales/size .43 < .001 
comparative figures/size .27 .002 
The normalized T's of Wilcoxon's test are: 
1 2 3 4 
1. Trade 
2. Industry .51 
3. Transport .00 57 
4. Misc. -1.84* -1.72* -132 
significant at 10% (two-tailed) 
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ment at fixed prices. It would not face serious competitive pressures by disdosing its sales and 
profit margins. 
As could be expected from the correlation with sales for the two items, there is also a certain 
correlation between disdosures of sales and comparative figures for each company.6 Given the 
fact that these two items suggested different disdosure behaviour a priori, this indicates that the 
degree of inconsistency (as discussed in paragraph 2) in disdosure behaviour is not too wide to 
prevent aggregation. More fonnal criteria to judge such inconsistency should, however, be 
developed before definite pronouncements are made. 
In interpreting these results one has to take into account that they are based on a number of 
less than ideal measures as described earlier. Nevertheless, it seems fair to state that the general 
trends in the data are as indicated in this paragraph. 
3.4. secondary analysis 
As has been stated earlier, size is in itself only a proxy of forces affecting disdosure. An 
examination of the actual forces at work during the period is necessary to interpret the findings 
of the previous paragraph. The following factors can be considered: 
3.4.1. Foreign listings 
In studies involving firms outside the United States, disdosure behaviour is often related to the 
fact that firms may be listed on foreign exchanges, and therefore be subject to the requirements 
imposed by these exchanges (see Cooke 1989). Dutch authors, like Burgert (1965) have partly 
attributed voiuntary improvements in finanrial reporting to the influence of US listing require-
ments. In the example being studied, only two firms had foreign listings at the time of their 
initial sales disdosures. Both AKU and Royal Dutch/ Shell Group took up listings on the New 
York Stock Exchange in 1954, which may explain their sales disdosures in 1952 and 1953. That 
the fmandal reporting of these companies was affected by this listing is shown by the fact that 
AKU issued the first Dutch quarterly statements in 1953. This was at the time explidtly linked 
to the New York listing. 
3.4.2. Impending legislation 
It can be argued that disdosure of sales after 1965, and espedally after 1968 was not entirely 
voiuntary. In january 1965 the committee charged with the reconsideration of company law 
issued its report7. The draft law on finanrial reporting included in the report was quite clear in 
demanding sales disdosure of all but the smallest companies. These could comply by disdosing 
index figures. By mentioning the example of Germany and the United States, fears of competi-
tive pressures were discounted. Sales disdosure was thought to be demanded by the "minimal 
standards of accountability". The favourable reception of the draft made adoption of its essentials 
a very likely event. In 1968 a draft law was issued by the ministry which was for practical 
purposes (and in any case in the matter of sales) identical to the proposal of the committee. 
The further dissemination of sales disdosure among companies after 1965 took place in a 
seemingly haphazard way. A test on rank-correlation in this section of the sample shows no 
significant relation with size. 
Pearson's coeffident on the correlation between the years of disdosure is .28. This can be 
assumed to be different from zero with confidence .01 (two-tailed). 
7
 Herziening van het Ondernemingsrecht. Rapport van de Commissie ingesteld bij 
beschikking van de Minister van Justitie van 8 april 1960, The Hague, 1965 
8
 For n = 39, Spearman's coeffident = -0.15 
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If one leaves out from the sample the two companies with foreign listings and those disclosing 
after 1965, the resulting firms show no significant correlation between size and disclosure order. 
This suggests that size is a useful criterion in separating those companies that were willing to 
disclose voluntarily (for whatever reason) and those that were ultimately not willing to disclose, 
and did so only when disclosure became inevitable as a result of legislation. 
Within these groups, size is not a particularly relevant determinant of disclosure behaviour. This 
is readily acceptable for the later group: the impending legislation would have worked, at least 
for companies as included in this sample, independent of size. 
For the first group, reasons for disclosure may have existed that operated independent of size. 
3.4.3. Recommendations bv the Dutch emplovers' associations 
A factor that must be considered in any study of voluntary Gnancial reporting during this period 
is the influence of Dutch employers' associations. 
Somewhat surprisingly at first sight, Dutch employers' associations took a leading role in 
stimulating financial reporting. In 1955 and 1962, reports were issued by committees installed in 
collective action by the four associations of employers which described what an ideal fmancial 
statement looked like1 . These reports were quite progressive (although the first more so than 
the second) and advocated disclosure that went considerably beyond the practice of many 
companies. This is seen by the favourable and almost surprised reactions by the fmancial press. 
The fact that such a progressive document was issued by employers was recognized as a singular 
event. 
Both studies recommended sales disclosure in quite strong terms, and rejected the arguments 
against disclosure based on competitive pressures for most companies. The background of these 
studies was not a detached interest in extensive reporting for its own sake. The first report was 
a bold public relations attempt made to improve the standing of business in the public view 
and to create goodwill in the capital market. 
The second report was aimed directly at influencing the conclusions of the recently installed 
Verdam commission charged with the revision of company law. It was assumed that organized 
business could prevent severe legislation by working voluntarily on improvements in fmancial 
reporting. 
There have been no systematic studies of the effects of these reports. Most Dutch authors on 
the subject acknowledge their beneficial influence, but there is disagreement on the extent of the 
influence. This influence is assumed to have been gradual. An examination of yearly initial 
disclosures (graph 2, p 18) does not reveal any developments that could with any degree of 
confidence be attributed to the influence of the reports. 
Given then that these reports did not lead to universal adaptation of sales disclosure, one would 
expect that companies that were represented on their drafting committees practised their own 
recommendations to a greater extent than the others. Ten companies of varying size from the 
sample were represented on one or both of the committees. Their disclosure scores on sales are 
indeed lower (ie: they disclosed earlier) than the median score of the entire sample. One 
cannot infer more, though, than a somewhat greater inclination to disclose sales. On closer 
9
 n= 33, Spearman = 0.12 
10
 Het Jaarverslag, rapport van de Commissie Jaarverslaggeving van het Verbond van 
Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Centraal Sociaal Werkgeversverbond, het Katholiek Verbond van 
Werkgeversvakverenigingen, het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, 
The Hague, March 1955; and: 
Verslaggeving verantwoording en voorlichting door de besturen van naamloze vennootschappen, 
issued by the Raad van Nederlandse Werkgeversverbonden, The Hague, October 1962. 
with a two-tailed sign-test, and a significance level of 2 %. 
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inspection, it appears that, of the nine companies serving on the first committee, two (Philips 
and Unilever, both multinationals) already disclosed sales before 1955, that 6 disclosed only after 
1962 or not at all, and that only one (Hoogovens, 1960) disclosed for the first time between the 
two reports. 
The overall higher score is therefore due to the high proportion of multinationals and to the 
fact that other companies serving on the first committee responded better than average to the 
report of the second. 
Examples from the sample point both ways: Van Gelder & Zonen, a paper firm represented on 
the 1955 committee, made several changes in its 1955 report while referring explicitly to the 
1955 report, but did not disclose sales. 
This can be contrasted with the behaviour of Thomas & Drijver and Key & Kramer, companies 
not represented on the 1955 committee, but that did considerably extend the quality of their 
reports in 1955, including sales. 
As f ar as the two items in this study are concerned, these reports cannot be said to have had 
any distinct influence on financial reporting. In the case of comparative figures, they came too 
late. In the case of sales, no concluding evidence is available. The best that can be said is that 
these reports seem to have given companies that were already inclined to do so an impulse to 
improve their reporting. This impulse was somewhat stronger, but definitely not irresistible, in 
the case of companies represented on the boards, and seems to have acted in a random way on 
other companies. 
3.4.4. The Stock Exchange 
The main private sector body in charge of securities trading during this period, the 'Vereeniging 
voor den Effectenhandel', declined to give hard rules on financial reporting. It required listed 
companies to publish financial statements, but did not prescribe their contents until some 
summary rules were given in 1983. The Vereeniging has been criticized for this attitude in the 
contemporary press. It cannot be said, though, that it was completely inactive. But it preferred 
to work through less formal channels in nudging companies towards more informative financial 
reporting. 
In 1949 and 1951 it issued two releases12 calling on its members, the stock brokers, to stimulate 
their clients towards fuller disclosure. 
In the second of these releases, a strong call for comparative figures was made. Attributing the 
sudden outburst of comparative figures in 1951 (see graph p. 18) to this release seems the most 
reasonable explanation of this phenomenon. This can be seen as an example of a stimulant that 
is more or less specific to the few items covered in the release. 
In 1954 an annual award for company financial reporting was announced by the financial daily 
'Het Financieele Dagblad', the so-called Henry Sijthoff award. Its jury was until 1974 composed 
exclusively of representatives of the three associations of securities dealers that between them 
organized all securities trading. The stock exchange itself sees the award as a significant part of 
its effort in developing financial reporting. The norms used in awarding the prizes were first 
published in 1956. Sales disclosure was presented as being very desirable. Speeches at the 
occasion of the awarding of the prizes were frequently used by stock exchange leadership to 
express its views on financial reporting. In the speech at the occasion of the 1959 awards for 
example the importance of complete income statements was stressed13. 
Although the perceived influence of the prize is not inconsiderable, its real impact is hard to 
assess. There is anecdotal evidence that companies have changed their reporting practices in 
order to win the award. 
12
 'Mededelingen van het Bestuur aan de Leden' nos 270 (15/1/1949) and 285 
(15/10/1951). These appear to be the only releases of this kind issued during the period under 
study dealing with financial reporting 
13
 Het Financieele Dagblad, December 9th, 1960 
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In the matter of sales disclosure, one can find an indication (albeit a slight one) of the 
importance attached by the jury to sales disclosure in awarding its prize in looking at the 
number of companies included in the sample that have won the prize during the period under 
consideration while actually disclosing sales at that moment. 
Of the 56 awards given for financial statements reporting on years between 1953 and 1970 (three 
or four each year), 31 were awarded to companies included in the sample. Of these 31 
companies, 24 did disclose their sales at the time they received the award. The other 7 cases 
occurred before 1964. 
From this one might infer that companies that did want to win the award would have at least to 
consider seriously (among other things) the disclosure of sales. 
3.4.5 Industrv and Intra-companv links 
The absence of a link between disclosure and industry is, in the light of other studies, mildly 
surprising (Coenenberg ca 1984). In this case, it can to a certain extent be ascribed to the rough 
classification used. But even if firms are clustered into more homogeneous groups, there is still 
no significant relation with sales disclosure. 
An alternative grouping is that according to intra-company links. Such links can be found in the 
form of cross-holdings, joint subsidiaries, often accompanied by multiple board memberships. 
A first glance at the few capital associations between companies in the sample seems to indicate 
a possible relation with disclosure. 
Two examples are: 
The participation of Hoogovens (Steelmaking) in 51% of the shares of Demka (another steel 
firm). Both disclosed sales in 1960. 
In the shipping sector, a group of five companies was closely interrelated by cross holdings. In 
1970, they finally merged into one. In this year they also disclosed, simultaneously and in 
separate financial statements, their sales. Other shipping companies had preceded them in this 
since 1964. 
A more systematic examination of such linkages can be made on the basis of multiple board 
memberships. As in other countries, dutch executive and non-executive directors often sat at 
the boards of several companies at the same time. Some of these multiple memberships were 
related to cross-holdings. 
If one considers only the instances from the sample in which two companies shared two or more 
members in their executive and supervisory boards in 1960, a group of 41 links results. 
The sales disclosures of these linked companies show a significant correlation. Naturally, this 
result has to be interpreted with some care, as the situation of 1960 is not entirely indicative of 
the situation throughout the period. 
One does not necessarily have to suppose an active involvement of non-executive directors in 
drafting financial statements in order to account for such a link. But one would expect the 
composition of the Supervisory board to reflect to a certain extent the outlook of management 
in such broad matters as "openness". And in an important matter as sales disclosure, company 
behaviour can apparently to a limited extent be estimated from the composition of the combined 
boards. 
Shipping (14 companies), chemicals (13 companies), textiles (9 companies), machinery (11 
companies) do not deviate significantly from the population mean according to a sign-test at 1%. 
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 Dutch companies had (and still have) an executive board ("bestuur") and a supervisory 
board ("raad van commissarissen"). The members of the latter board are roughly equivalent to 
american and english non-executive directors 
Pearson Coëfficiënt of .48 
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An examination of some of these linkages show that they cross industry lines to a considerable 
extent. Hoogovens (Steelmaking) for instance, was at the centre of a rather complex network of 
steelmakers, -users and -traders. This could, to a certain extent, explain the lack of significance 
of industry as an indicator of disclosure. Many firms were apparently more focused on their 
trade relations than on their competitors. 
The degree to which such multiple memberships occurred in the Netherlands seems not to have 
differed substantially from that in the United States, according to the contemporary study by 
Vinke (1%1). However, US studies in which this characteristic is taken into account are not 
known to the author. 
3.4.6. Individual characteristics. 
In the case of a few companies, one can attribute improvements in disclosure to 'personal' 
factors. Such factors would seem to be the final resort in any explanation of corporate 
behaviour, but they are seldom properly documented. 
In the case of Philips, a multinational electronics firm, corporate pride and a genuine desire for 
better reporting for its own sake seem to have played a definite role, as it was under no 
obligation to improve its reporting as a result of foreign listing. At the time that other 
multinationals, Royal Dutch/Shell and AKU started disclosing sales, presumably in connection 
with their New York listing, Philips was only traded in the over-the-counter market. During the 
early fifties, financial reporting was in the hands of A. Goudeket, chief of the internal audit 
department. He has written quite extensively both in Dutch and English on financial reporting 
issues, and is known as an advocate of replacement value. He was one of the leading figures on 
the 1955 employers' committee. Philips' president, mr P.F.S. Otten was firmly behind him on 
more extensive disclosure as witnessed by a speech held at the 1954 annual meeting of 
shareholders17. 
The other multinational that published extensive financial reports without any apparent obligation 
to do so was Unilever. This company displayed a progressive attitude in financial reporting by, 
for example, disclosing sales as early as 1945, and providing breakdowns of sales according to 
product line and geographical areas since 1945 and 1947 respectively. Its chairman, dr P. 
Rijkens, took himself an interest in accounting matters as witnessed by his biography and the 
issues discussed in his speeches to the annual meetings of shareholders. He was therefore a 
natural and undisputed choice as chairman of the 1955 Employers' committee in which he 
actively participated. 
In a 1960 newspaper article, he gave some of his views on the work of the newly established 
commission charged with revision of company law. Among other proposals, he advised to require 
sales disclosure of all companies for which 'sales' was a relevant measure of activity.18 
Het beleid van Philips ten aanzien van de voorlichting van aandeelhouders, published in 
as a brochure by Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken, Eindhoven, 1954. 
18
 P. Rijkens, 'Publieke verantwoording van de naamloze vennootschap', in: Algemeen 
Handelsblad. 16 november 1960 
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3ü. Summary of case study 
From the above it appears that while firms were formally free in their disclosure decisions, a 
number of factors may have prompted them towards fuller disclosure. 
This resulted in a pattern in which, in the early fifties, a relatively small number of multinational 
firms started to disclose sales, some of them in relation to foreign listings. Firms that foliowed 
them during the period preceding the first draft of the 1970 law in 1965 may have done so 
because of a variety of reasons. These reasons can include being represented at one of the two 
employers' committees, the Henri Sijthoff award and the example of associated firms. A 
considerable part of observed disclosure must apparently be explained by imponderable factors 
as management attitudes. 
That these forces had mainly an effect on the largest companies as attested by the correlation of 
disclosure and size was probably the result of a doctrine that gained widespread acceptance at 
the time. It was assumed that small or single-product companies would be seriously damaged in 
competition by revealing their sales figure. The 1955 and 1962 employers' reports and the Henry 
Sijthoff norms had an escape clause granting such companies the privilege to abstain from sales 
disclosure if this would seriously damage their interests. None of these specified, bowever, what 
was to be understood under 'serious damage', so in practice the waiver was assumed to apply to 
small companies. This would give all but the very large multinationals at least the possibihty of 
defending non-disclosure in their shareholders' meetings by pointing to possible damage done by 
disclosure. 
The 1965 and 1968 drafts did not specify the criteria that had to be met in order to refrain 
from disclosing sales. But the official commentary on the law made it quite clear that this 
exemption would apply only to truly small companies. From this moment on, size became 
irrelevant for most of the companies surveyed. 
Although disclosure of comparative fïgures can be related to size as well, the conclusion that 
both sales disclosure and disclosure of comparative fïgures are related to size has a very limited 
meaning. In the two cases, the factors underlying the results were quite different. The issue of 
comparative fïgures was never particularly controversial, and companies needed only a little 
prompting (apparently from the stock exchange) to adopt it universally. In subsequent recom-
mendations there is understandably no exception for smaller companies. This shows at any rate 
that companies were aware of the issue of improving financial reporting, and that they could 
take swift action if they saw sufficiënt reason for doing so. 
Such reasons were for a number of companies not available as far as sales are concerned up 
until the moment that the draft law was revealed. An example of the divergence in reporting 
practice within one company is given by Heemaf, a firm dealing in electronic machinery. This 
company was among the very first to disclose comparative figures (in 1937), but it waited until 
1969 to disclose sales. 
Concerning the question of voluntary improvements versus regulation by law that so occupied 
contemporaries, it can be remarked that the answer appears to be item-specific. 
In the case of comparative figures, the companies themselves, probably aided by the Stock 
Exchange, were quite capable of reaching an adequate level reporting at an early stage. The 
rather extensive debate in parliament on the inclusion of a paragraph calling for comparative 
figures at the passage of the 1970 law seems superfluous in this light. 
On the other hand, the fact that a considerable number of companies, among which quite large 
ones, were not disclosing sales in 1965 (more than twenty years after the initial disclosure 
recorded by this study) might cause some impatience with the pace of voluntary progress, or 
even doubts about its final effectiveness. 
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4. General conclusions 
Although it is a precarious undertaking to generalize from a single instance, some implications 
for disclosure research can be inferred from this case. 
More forma! conclusions as arrived at in the current research literature, such as a positive 
relation between disclosure and size can probably be maintained in a multi-year context, 
provided that the conclusion is framed as hnplying that large companies disclose items earlier 
than smaller. 
It should be realized, though, that such conclusions have only limited meaning, as influences 
underlying such behaviour may change over time and have different impacts on different items. 
Of course, aggregation could smooth out inconsistencies and individual traits and should do so 
as it is meant to bring out what is constant and general. But it seems that studies specifically 
directed at bringing to light the possible extent of diversity covered by averages are at least as 
necessary as aggregate studies in understanding the process of voluntary development in financial 
reporting. 
A task for future research should be the development of proper criteria which can be used in 
measuring the degree of inconsistency in specific cases to determine the applicability of 
aggregate measures of disclosure, or, on the other hand, to develop methods for incorporating 
such inconsistencies by weights on a more solid basis than user surveys. 
If one assumes that the importance of an item is to a certain extent inversely related to the 
willingness on the part of management to disclose such an item, weights could be derived from 
the variance and the skewedness of the introduction curve, that is, the function representing the 
yearly number of initial disclosures. 
It can also be concluded that some care should be taken in determining the point in time at 
which a single-period study is undertaken. Forces affecting disclosure may change virtually 
overnight, especially in the case of the issuance of non-mandatory but authoritative pronounce-
ments. Once a period has been chosen, factors influencing disclosure may be found before as 
well as after that period, as in the case of impending legislation. 
In single-period studies dealing with a small number of items, the effects of choice of period can 
be considerable as changes in disclosure practice can be completed within a short period. 
Although single-period studies could thus benefit from findings of multi-period studies serving as 
pilots, the further possible uses of single-period studies seem to be limited. Repeated research 
studies have come up with more or less identical conclusions. Extension of aggregate studies 
over a number of periods is difficult, however. Changes in firm characteristics that affect 
disclosure behaviour on different items differently and changes in the relative value attached to 
items could probably be handled, but at the cost of realism or significance of the results. In this 
study, a number of simplifying assumptions had to be made to accommodate the effects of 
mergers and changes in size. This sets a limit to the precision to be used in aggregate research. 
The aggregate study aiming for generally applicable conclusions seems to have served its purpose 
in indicating the broad Unes along which more detailed studies can be undertaken to detect the 
specific factors and deviations that mark individual cases. Such studies could be justified simply 
by the desire to understand the one's own environment in more detail than is possible by 
general characterizations, but also by the more general purpose of understanding the extent of 
variation covered by such general conclusions. 
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Appendix Disclosure data 
Table 1. Sales 
Comoanv Year of Initial 
Sales Disclosure 
Unilever 1945 
KLM 1946 
Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor de Walvischvaart 1946,5 
Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken 1951 
Kon Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken 1952 
Koninklijke Petroleum Maatschappij 1952 
AKU 1953 
Key & Kramer 1955 
Thomassen & Drijver Blikemballagefabrieken 1955 
J.P. Wijers' Industrie- & Handelsonderneming 1956,5 
Braat Bouwstoffen 1959 
Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij 1959 
Overzeesche Gas- en Electriciteits Maatschappij 1959 
Cindu 1960 
Koninklijke Demka Staalfabrieken 1960 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken 1960 
P.F. van Vlissingen & Co's Katoenfabrieken 1960 
Aannemingmaatschappij "de Kondor" 1961 
Machinefabriek Du Croo & Brauns 1961,5 
Heineken's Bierbrouwerij Maatschappij 1961,5 
Koninklijke Zwavelzuurfabrieken v/h Ketjen 1962 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Zoutindustrie 1962 
de Erven de Weduwe J. van Nelle 1962 
Intervam 1962 
Koninklijke Zwanenberg-Organon 1962 
Albert Heyn 1963 
G.H. Bührmann's Papiergroothandel 1963 
Koninklijke Fabrieken Dicpenbrock & Reigers 1963 
Lettergieterij "Amsterdam" vh N.Tetterode 1963 
Thomsens's Havenbedrijf 1963 
Intematinale Crediet- & Handelsvereeniging "Rotterdam" 1964 
van der Heem 1964 
Vereenigde Nederlandsche Scheepvaartmaatschappij 1964 
Blaauwhoed 1965 
Blydenstein & Co 1965 
"Lijempf* Leeuwarder Ds- en Melkproductenfabrieken 1965 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Gist- en Spiritusfabriek 1965 
Koninklijke Textielfabrieken Nijverdal-Ten Cate 1965 
Amsterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij 1966 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot-Maatschappij 1966 
C van der Giessen & Zonen's Scheepswerven 1966 
Furness' Scheepvaart & Agentuur Maatschappij 1967 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Papierfabriek 1967 
Meelfabrieken der Nederlandsche Bakkerij 1967 
Vereenigde Touwfabrieken 1967 
Wessanen's Koninklijke Fabrieken 1967 
Centrale Suiker Maatschappij 1967,5 
Vulcaansoord 1967,5 
Koninklijke Maatschappij "De Schelde" 1968 
Geveke & Co's Technisch Bureau 1968 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Grofsmederij 1968 
Hagemeyer & Co's Handelmaatschappij 1968 
Betonfabriek "de Meteoor" 1968 
R.S. Stokvis & Zonen 1968 
Koudys' Voederfabrieken BK 1968,5 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Vliegtuigenfabriek Fokker 1969 
Nederlandsch-Amerikaanse Stoomvaart-Maatschappij 1969 
Heemaf 1969 
Heybroek-Zé lander 1969 
Houthandel vh P.M & J. Jongeneel 1969 
Chemische Fabriek "Naarden" 1969 
Willem Smit & Co's Transformatorenfabriek 1969 
Houthandel vh William Pont 1969 
Wm H. Muller & Co 1969 
Magazijn "de Bijenkorf* 1969,5 
Borneo-Sumatra Handel Maatschappij 1970 
Geo. Wehry & Co 1970 
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table 1 Sales (continued) 
Hoek's Machine- en Zuurstoffabriek 1970 
Koninklijke Java-China Paketvaartlijnen 1970 
Koninklijke Rotterdamsche lioyd 1970 
Nederlandsche Scheepvaart Unie 1970 
Stoomvaartmaatschappij "Nederland" 1970 
Not disclosing by 1970 or earlier disappearance: 
ASW 
Tricotagefabrieken vh Frans Beeren & Zonen 
Biliton Maatschappij 
Bronswerk 
JA. Carp's Garenfabrieken 
Curacaosche Handel-Maatschappij 
Lijm- en Gelatinefabriek "Delft" 
Koninklijke Delftsche Leerlooierij en Drijfriemenfabriek vh Alex Adam 
Deli-Maatschappij 
Domaniale Mijn-Maatschappij 
Koninklijke Fabrieken T. Duyvis Jzn 
Metaalbuizenfabriek Maatschappij "Excelsior" 
Papierfabriek "Gelderland" 
Gerofabriek 
P. de Gruyter & Zoon 
Handelscompagnie 
Verenigde HVA-Maatschappijen 
Hollandia-Kattenburg 
Hollandsche Constructiewerkplaatsen 
Houtvaart 
Kempensche Zinkmaatschappij Zincs de la Campine 
Lindeteves-Jacoberg 
Machinehandel MAHEZ 
Motorenfabriek Thomassen 
van Nievelt, Goudriaan & Co's Stoomvaart Maatschappij 
Algemeene Norit Maatschappij 
Verenigde Nederlandse Brouwerijen Oranjeboom 
Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij 
Metaalbedrijf Rademakers 
Mij tot Expl. der CG.RommenhöUer'sche Koolzuur- en Zuurstofwerken 
Vereenigde Nederlandsche Rubberfabrieken 
Simplex Machine- en Rijwielfabrieken 
Spanjaard 
Stoomvaart Maatschappij "Oostzee" 
Koninklijke Vereenigde Tapijtfabrieken 
L.E. Tels & Co's Handelmaatschappij 
Tilburgsche Waterleiding-Maatschappij 
Twentsche Overzee Handelmaatschappij 
U. Twijnstra's Oliefabrieken 
Koninklijke Papierfabrieken van Gelder Zonen 
Phs van Ommeren 
Veenendaalsche Stoomspinnerij en Weverij 
Verschure & Co's Scheepswerf en Machinefabriek 
Nederlandsche Vlas Spinnerij 
Verenigde Machinefabrieken VMF 
van Waveren's Koninklijke Graanhandel 
Dok- en Werfmaatschappij Wilton-Feyenoord 
Koninklijke Ned fabriek van Wollen Dekens vh J.C Zaalberg 
Apeldoornse Nettenfabriek von Zeppelin & Co 
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Table 2. Comparative Figures 
Year Number of 
Initial disclosures 
< 1940 3 
1948 1 
1949 3 
1950 8 
1951 35 
1952 17 
1953 17 
1954 11 
1955 13 
1956 3 
1957 4 
1958 3 
> 1958 3 
Ï2Ï 
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